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This paper deals with the question of whether public venture capital (VC) is 
performing its task properly, taking a look at how public VC companies’ selection 
process, investment behavior, and consulting services reflect goals that differ from 
those of private VC firms. The results present evidence that public VC firms 
deliver a different market segment than their private counterparts; for example, 
their selection process and syndication behavior reveal their predominant goal of 
promoting the local economy. Although the results indicate that public VC firms 
are doing what is expected of them, the analyses provide evidence that public 
intervention should be reconsidered. 
 
JEL-classification:  G28, G32, O16, D21, M13 




“Staatliches Venture Capital in Deutschland – Sonderkommando oder 
Selbstzweck?“ 
Dieses Papier behandelt die Frage, inwieweit öffentlich gefördertes Venture 
Capital (VC) seine Aufgaben erfüllt. Zu diesem Zwecke wird untersucht, 
inwieweit der Selektionsprozess, das Investitionsverhalten und die 
Beratungsleistungen öffentlicher VC Gesellschaften ihre Ziel, die sich deutlich 
von denen privater VC Gesellschaften unterscheiden, widerspiegeln. Die 
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass öffentliche VC Gesellschaften ein anderes Marktsegment 
als ihre privaten Gegenüber beliefern. Beispielsweise verdeutlichen ihr 
Selektionsprozess und ihr Syndizierungsverhalten ihr vorrangiges Ziel der 
regionalen Wirtschaftsförderung. Auch wenn diese Ergebnisse darauf hindeuten, 
dass die öffentlichen VC Gesellschaften ihre Aufgabe erfüllen, gibt die Analyse 
dennoch Hinweise darauf, dass die derzeitige Form der staatlichen Eingriffe genau 
überdacht werden sollten. 
JEL-Klassifikation:  G28, G32, O16, D21, M13 







1.  Introduction 
Public venture capital (VC) activity is an evident part of the German VC market.
1 
However, we do not know much about whether public VC companies are doing 
what is expected of them. In the literature, public intervention in the VC market is 
often justified as a means of preventing the market failures that could discourage 
private VC companies from investing in start-ups. For example, these market 
imperfections arise with problems accompanying small-scale investments 
(McGlue, 2002; Harding, 2002). In an attempt to overcome these barriers, public 
authorities try to promote the local economy with a supply of capital for young 
and innovative companies. Furthermore, they attempt to establish financial and 
business networks that currently might not exist due to these market failures. In 
this way, the public authorities aim to develop a sustainable capital supply 
through private institutions. This justification, and the related goals, of public 
activity in the VC market leads to several tasks for public VC firms that might be 
quite different from the activities of their mainly profit-oriented private 
counterparts. 
Until now, the question of whether public VC intervention is performing these 
tasks or if it is merely an end in itself has not been completely answered. This 
paper contributes to our understanding of the task performance of public VC 
companies by comparing their goals, decision-making processes, and operations 
with those of their private counterparts. The relevant questions are: “To what 
extent do public and private VC companies in Germany differ? Do the operations 
of public VC companies appropriately reflect their goals of overcoming market 
failures and promoting the economy? Are private VC companies able to do the 
job now performed by public VC companies?” 
The analysis is based on a unique data set of personal interviews conducted at 
various VC companies in Germany. These data allow a direct comparison of the 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Sunley et al. (2005), Fritsch and Schilder (2006a), Bascha and Walz (2002), 




investment activities of public and private VC companies, and thus the task 
performance of public VC firms can be analyzed. Furthermore, the ability and 
willingness of private VC companies to take over investments currently held by 
their public counterparts can be examined with the survey data. These data enable 
the paper to focus on direct public VC intervention both through publicly owned 
VC companies and through VC firms with mainly public funding and influence. 
Other means of public activity regarding the VC market, such as public 
guarantees and grants for private investors, are not considered (see, e.g., 
Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2002, 2004). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The second section deals 
briefly with the role of public and private VC companies in Germany. The 
successive section proposes several hypotheses in regard to the tasks of public VC 
firms. This section is based on a review of the relevant literature (Section 3). In 
Section 4, the database is introduced with a focus on the differences and 
similarities of the two analyzed groups, and contains the empirical results of the 
comparison of the two groups of VC providers. In Section 5, the question of 
whether private VC might be able to undertake the current tasks of public VC 
companies is discussed. Finally, Section 6 concludes and sets out some areas for 
further research. 
2.  Public VC activity 
2.1  How important is public VC within the German VC industry? 
The relevance of the question of whether public VC is performing its task is 
deeply rooted in the role of public intervention in the German VC market. The 
importance of direct public VC activity in Germany is mainly unquestioned (see, 
e.g., Sunley et al., 2005; Plagge, 2006). The regional distribution of public VC 
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Figure 1: The spatial distribution of VC firms in Germany (symbol size shows 




The regional distribution of the members of the German Private Equity and 
Venture Capital Association (Bundesverband Deutscher 
Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften; BVK), as of January 2006, is rather unequal 
(Figure 1). The gray circles in Figure 1 demonstrate that the private sector of the 
German VC market is clustered in five regions: Munich, Frankfurt, Berlin, 
Hamburg, and the Rhine-Ruhr area. The black sections indicate VC companies 
that can be said to have a predominantly public influence, that is, they are state 
owned or operate with public capital. These VC companies can be divided into 
three types: subsidiaries of public savings banks and state banks, the 
Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften (MBG), and other VC companies 
having mainly public investors. The MBGs are a specific form of public VC in 
Germany. They were founded in the 1970s by all the federal states, except 
Bremen, and have been established in cooperation with local banks and industry 
representatives. Their investments are restricted to the specific state. Overall, the 
BVK data clearly show that public VC companies are largely clustered in a 
relatively to the relatively few areas of the German VC industry. 
Of the more than 170 members of the BVK, only around 45 are public VC 
firms, a definite minority compared to private VC firms. However, Figure 1 
clearly shows that their regional distribution is more equal, as no obvious regional 
public VC core exists. Furthermore, many public VC firms are located in cities 
where there are no private VC companies, such as Regensburg or Erfurt. Figure 2 
shows the number of investments made by the MBGs in the period 2001 to 2005 
(German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, Statistics, 2001–2005). 
This is illustrative of the strong public VC activity in Germany. The regional 
distribution of the investments is highly unequal. In 2005, for example, Bavaria 
and Baden-Wurttemberg each had more than 80 investments by MBGs, whereas 
Thuringia had less than 10 investments. Overall, the MBGs account for nearly 
half the total number of VC investments made by BVK members. However, the 
invested volume of 182.5 million € in 2005 is only around 16 percent of the 
overall invested amount, which shows that the MBG investments, on average, are 
rather small. These small-size investments indicate strong public VC activity in a 
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Figure 2: The spatial distribution of investments by the German Mittelständische 
Beteiligungsgesellschaften (symbol size shows total number) 
The regional distribution of public VC companies and their investments 
(Figures 1 and 2) demonstrates that public VC companies play an important role 
in the German VC market. They are not only represented in the large VC centers, 




cities all over the country, for example, Regensburg in the southeast or Dresden in 
the eastern part of Germany. Although regional proximity between the VC 
company and the portfolio firm is not a necessary requirement for VC investments 
(Fritsch and Schilder, 2006a, 2006b), the equal regional distribution might 
indicate that public VC companies are active at the local scene, whereas private 
VC companies are more like distant but still attendant landlords. Furthermore, 
public VC companies display a specific investment behavior in that they are very 
active in the small-size investment sector, an area private VC companies are often 
reluctant to enter. 
2.2  The rationale of public VC intervention 
The justification for public intervention in the VC market is mainly tripartite. 
First, it is argued from a static perspective that public VC activity should help 
overcome market failures that may lead to an equity gap for young and innovative 
companies (McGlue, 2002). Second, assuming a dynamic perspective, it is argued 
that a young and developing private VC market may just need a stimulus to 
motivate it (Leleux and Surlemont, 2003). The third type of argument spans the 
first two and is based on spillover and social effects. It says that public authorities 
should try to create an environment that will stimulate an entrepreneurial and 
innovative activity (McGlue, 2002). All three motivations imply that public VC 
activity should be more or less complementary to the private VC supply. 
Otherwise, there would be a public crowding-out effect that would hinder private 
VC investments. 
The reasoning behind justifying public VC activity as a means of overcoming 
market failure in the form of an equity gap is mainly grounded in the specific 
assumption that the private sector alone is not able to deliver sufficient capital for 
young and innovative companies. Information failures, such as information 
asymmetries between the VC company and the entrepreneur, or a moral hazard 
problem (Harding, 2002) might result in an insufficient supply of capital. Further 
market imperfections, for example, a lack of suitable exit possibilities for VC 
investments, can enhance this effect. This kind of an equity gap for young and 




(Harding, 2002; Martin et al., 2005). The costs of searching for, monitoring, and 
supervising investments do not vary significantly between small and large 
investments. Thus, the overall returns of large investments are higher (Harding, 
2002). Therefore, the expected return-cost ratio of small investments is lower than 
those of larger ones and, consequently, small- and medium-sized companies might 
face restrictions in the supply of risk capital (Martin et al., 2005). 
The second argument for public VC intervention—that the VC market needs a 
stimulus—is based on a more dynamic perspective. It assumes that the VC market 
needs some sort of precursor, signaling that, although risky, providing equity to 
entrepreneurs can be a profitable business (McGlue, 2002). The larger the VC 
network becomes, the more positive will be the network effects (Sorensen and 
Stuart, 2001). Thus this justification for public VC intervention posits that public 
VC activity should help the industry boost itself out of infancy (Leleux and 
Surlemont, 2003) and, at the same time, that the crowding out of private 
investments, as indicated, for example, in a study by Cumming and MacIntosh 
(2006) on the Canadian VC market, will be avoided. Proof of this seeding 
argument in the literature is inconsistent. For example, Hood (2000) found 
evidence that the Scottish public VC program SDF was followed by the formation 
of new private VC funds. In contrast, Da Rin et al. (2006) show for Europe that 
the spending a large amount of public funds does not seem to stimulate private 
early-stage investments. However, the seeding argument is not completely 
disproved and is often used by public authorities (European Commission, 2003). 
The third justification argument for public VC activity more or less 
encompasses the first two arguments. The creation of an environment conducive 
to entrepreneurial growth is heavily linked to a sufficient supply of capital 
(Friedman, 1995; Harding, 2000; Zook, 2002), which can be ensured only by the 
creation of a strong financial network and the support of public VC companies to 
overcome possible market failures. However, the final goal of public authorities is 
not only the promotion of entrepreneurship but also the emergence of innovation, 
economic growth, and employment through start-ups (McGlue, 2002; Hood, 




be multiplied even more by “social returns,” for example, through spillovers 
achieved by the positive externalities of innovation (Boadway and Tremblay, 
2005; Lerner, 1999). For this purpose, VC is regarded as a catalyst for 
entrepreneurial and innovative activity (Florida and Kenney, 1988; Kortum and 
Lerner, 2000). However, some studies find evidence that innovative activity does 
not always follow capital but vice versa, which does serious damage to the 
assumption of public VC as a catalyst for entrepreneurship (Florida and Smith, 
1993; Martin et al., 2005; Fritsch and Schilder, 2006a). 
Before turning to examples of some specific tasks undertaken by public VC 
companies that arise out of these justifications, the reader should be aware that 
direct public VC intervention in Germany is a regional business. The respective 
companies generally act on behalf of regional governments, such as at the state or 
district level, and utilize this government’s money. Therefore, public VC 
companies have a clear regional restriction and focus. Furthermore, they are 
deeply interconnected with local businesses and social networks. In the following, 
I briefly discuss some of the tasks undertaken by public VC companies, based on 
the three justification arguments set out above, which are greatly different from 
the goals of private VC firms. Three distinctive differences between the activity of 
public and private VC firms are hypothesized. The differences in tasks and 
behavior mainly reflect the regional focus of public VC companies. 
First, the development of a functioning VC market of a specific size means 
that public VC companies either have to attract other financiers to invest in their 
region (McGlue, 2002) or they must signal local financiers that VC investments 
are a profitable business (Hood, 2002; Lerner, 2002). This can be done by helping 
private VC firms overcome the information asymmetries between VC company 
and entrepreneur (Lerner, 1999), a capability that is grounded in the good regional 
market knowledge that public VC firms possess due to their strong regional 
commitment (Sunley et al., 2005). Furthermore, public VC companies have the 
advantage of a large network of experts, something possibly less available to 
private VC firms (Lerner, 2002). In addition, the amounts invested by public VC 




with financiers from other regions. Syndication means that several investors are 
involved with a single investment. The investors share the volume of investment 
as well as the risk and the work involved (Brander et al., 2002; Lockett and 
Wright, 2001; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Doran and Bannock, 2000). The 
syndication partners can benefit greatly from public VC companies’ access to 
local networks (Fritsch and Schilder, 2006a). Therefore, I expect public VC 
companies to engage in two types of syndication behavior. They will syndicate 
with local investors to strengthen the regional financial networks, and they will 
form syndicates with financiers that are not located in their region so as to attract 
nonlocal capital and enlarge the local VC supply (Mason and Harrison, 1991). 
Second, public VC companies’ duty to promote local entrepreneurial and 
innovative activity might influence the way they select investments. This is 
particularly important in the cases where private investors refuse to invest. In 
addition to a possible superior selection process due to good regional market 
knowledge (Sunley et al., 2005), public VC companies’ may select investment 
based on factors not usually considered by private VC companies. For example, 
the outcome of an investment might not be measured solely by the monetary 
return of the investment, as it is for private VC companies (Hood, 2000). 
Although Leleux and Surlemont (2003) could not find a significant relationship 
between public VC activity and high employment industries, the potential effects 
on regional economic development might be an important output considered by 
public VC companies in their selection process. Second, their highly developed 
access to regional networks (Sunley et al., 2005) enables public VC companies to 
discover specific regional needs, and this will influence their deal flow. Their 
close relationship with local incubators or the chambers of industry and commerce 
can grant access to possible investments. This lead to the assumption that public 
VC companies will use different selection processes, and possibly orient the 
direction of their flow of investment, differently than will their private 
counterparts. 
Third, there are several factors that can influence the monitoring and advising 




than will private VC investors. Public VC companies’ lower return requirements 
(Bascha and Walz, 2002), in combination with their strong desire to enhance local 
economic development (Sunley et al., 2005; Tykvova, 2004), allows or even 
forces them to establish a more intensive and costly contact with the portfolio 
firms than that usually undertaken by private VC firms. Furthermore, as public 
VC companies often make investments in enterprises that cannot attract private 
VC, they may have more problematic cases in their portfolio. These investments 
require more attention and involvement from the financier, activities that are time 
consuming and costly. Private VC firms, which have a return maximizing focus, 
cannot afford such intensive relationships. Additionally, many public VC firms 
are not only trying to promote start-ups but are interested in many other kinds of 
businesses. Therefore, public VC companies may focus more on later-stage 
investments (Bottazzi et al., 2004). Later-stage investments usually require less 
involvement by the financier than do early-stage investments (Sapienza et al., 
1996) because of the lack of management or technical knowledge in the early 
stages of a company’s development, a lack that, in pursuit of protecting its 
investment, the financier has to provide (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992). 
The monitoring and advising activities engaged in by public VC companies 
might also depend on the financial products they use. They generally prefer 
products that do not involve voting rights, such as silent partnerships (Tykvova, 
2004; Bascha and Walz, 2002). Thus they have less participation in the financed 
firms’ profits than, for example, they would with direct ownership (Bascha and 
Walz, 2002). This leads to fewer consulting activities by the financiers because 
they have less incentive to generate fast growth of the financed firm (Schäfer and 
Schilder, 2006). Furthermore, the fact that many public investment managers are 
civil servants and government employees might influence their consulting 
activities. Their different educational backgrounds (Bottazzi et al., 2004) and 
incentive structures—they payment systems are different from those of private 
fund mangers—may make them less effective consultants (Leleux and Surlemont, 
2003). In summary, two assumptions can be made about public VC investments in 
regard to monitoring and advising: (1) there might be a greater amount of 




and a duty to promote the local economy; and (2) their later stage investments, the 
financial products used and the different incentive structure and educational 
background of their employees could hinder monitoring and consulting. 
3.  Do the operations of public VC companies reflect their goals? 
3.1  The database 
The empirical analyses are based on an interview survey that was conducted 
between September 2004 and September 2005. The survey consists of 51 face-to-
face interviews with investment managers who were actively involved in 
corporate financing and were mainly specialized in start-up financing. All 
interviews were based on a largely standardized questionnaire that allowed room 
for further qualitative information. The questions pertained mainly to investment 
behavior—the selection of investments and the monitoring and supervising of 
portfolio companies. A special focus was placed on the syndication of 
investments. Several pretests gave evidence that the questionnaire was properly 
relevant for the information sought. 
The interviewed institutions were selected by hand based on the regional 
distribution of the German VC industry. Out of the initially selected 300 financial 
institutions, 85 agreed to participate in the interview. Fifty-one of these financiers 
are VC suppliers. For the purpose of this paper, the other 34 financiers, 
comprising mainly banks and private individuals, are excluded from the analyses. 
Reflective of the overall VC market, the 51 VC companies show a strong 
heterogeneity in regard to their industry and regional investment focus, size, age, 
and institutional background. The participating financiers are all actively 
investing, which guarantees the relevance of the data for investigating actual VC 
investment behavior. I interviewed one manager per firm who was actively 
involved in the financing and supervising process. The interviews lasted between 
50 and 90 minutes. 
For the purposes of this paper, I divide the VC financiers into two groups: 




comprising subsidiaries of public savings banks, merchant and development 
banks, and MBGs. These investors are either state owned or operate with public 
money. There are 28 firms in the second group, including independent and 
corporate VC companies as well as subsidiaries of private banks. The firms from 
the sample are representative of the respective type of VC institutions. 
3.2  Structure and investment behavior of public and private VC firms 
The data from the interviewed VC companies show a strong heterogeneity 
between public and private VC firms. This heterogeneity is important as the 
different objectives of both groups could lead to different investment behaviors, 
e.g., through the offered products and services. This section provides a descriptive 
overview of several differences between the two types of companies. The first 
distinction has to do with the financial products employed. The range of possible 
answers to the question of how important diverse products are to public and 
private VC suppliers is from 1 (the investor does not supply this product at all) to 




Public VC Private VC
Majority holdings








Public VC Private VC
Majority holdings











Figure 3: Importance of financial products (mean values) 
Figure 3 illustrates that private VC firms are strongly focused on direct equity 
investments, mainly as minority holdings with up to 25 percent or between 25 and 




prefer minority holdings up to 25 percent and are considerably in favor of silent 
investments. The latter product is located between equity and debt in balance-
sheet terms. Other mezzanine products, credits, and majority holdings appear to 
be less appealing to both groups. These findings are in line with former research 
(Tykvova, 2004; Bascha and Walz, 2002). The financial products used are 
congruent with the different aims of both groups. Direct investments are usually 
accompanied by many rights of influence and a participation in the portfolio 
companies’ return. This type of investment makes it possible to achieve a private 
VC company’s goal of generating profit. In contrast, public VC companies 
predominantly use a product that usually has no voting rights and a fixed interest 
rate, the use of which reflects their aim of supplying capital for their investments, 
instead of exerting influence on the portfolio firms or generating as much profit as 
possible. 
Public and private VC companies show further heterogeneity in their share of 
early-stage investments within their portfolios (Figure 4). On average, private VC 
firms put more than 60 percent of their investments in companies that are in early 
stages of development; public VC suppliers have a mean of 34 percent of their 
funds in early-stage investments. This finding supports the assumption that public 
VC firms have a duty and/or a tendency to promote companies at all stages of 
their development, not only start-ups. This finding is surprisingly counterintuitive, 
however, as the lack of private capital is said to be very large for early-stage 
investments (Martin et al., 2005). 
The resources available to each of the two groups are another point of 
difference (Figure 4). Resources are measured by the average number of 
investments each investment manager is required to monitor and advise. The ratio 
of portfolio companies to investment manager is important because the more 
companies a manager has to supervise, the less time he or she can spend on each 
one. Within private VC companies, each manager is responsible for an average of 
3.5 investments, whereas the mean of the portfolio companies per manager for the 
public VC firms is 9.7. The investment managers of public VC firms have a clear 




that public VC companies might engage in fewer monitoring and consulting 
activities compared to their private counterparts. First, later-stage investments 
need less financier involvement as they are usually at the point where they can 
sufficiently manage their own business (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et 
al., 1996). Second, public VC companies’ fewer resources, and the related 
restrictions on time and knowledge, lead to less consulting and monitoring, 
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Figure 4: Share of early-stage investments and ratio of portfolio companies per 
investment manager (mean values) 
Public VC companies distinguish themselves from private VC firms in regard 
to the spatial dimension of their investment behavior (Figure 5). Public VC 
companies are often restricted by law or by their articles to regional investment 
activities. This regional restriction can range anywhere from a district, which 
would contain many public savings banks’ VC subsidiaries, up to a federal state, 
which is the investment area of the MBGs. The questionnaire asked: “Which 
share of your portfolio is within the following circumference: at site; not at site 




abroad?” Unsurprisingly, the public VC companies in the survey have 81.6 
percent of their investments at the same site or within 100 kilometers and only 0.5 
percent abroad. In contrast, more than 68 percent of private VC investment is over 
100 kilometers away from the VC companies’ location and only 18 percent is at 
the same site. The results reflect the regional limitations of public VC companies 
and prove that they do, indeed, fulfill their duty to promote regional economic 
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Figure 5: Average share of investments within a certain distance (in percentage of 
the total portfolio) 
Another geographic-related difference between the public and private VC 
firms is public VC firms’ syndication behavior, particularly the distance to the 
syndication partner (Figure 6). The interviewees were asked: “Which share of 
your overall syndication partners is within the following circumference: at site; 
not at site but within 100 kilometers; more than 100 kilometers but within 
Germany or abroad?” On the one hand, public VC companies might syndicate 
with investors that are far away and in this way try to attract investors from 
outside of their resident region. This would create a further flow of capital for the 




public VC firms might try to build a strong regional financial network by 
syndicating with local or regional investors. The data seem to support the second 
assumption. Public VC companies have only 35.6 percent of their syndication 
partners within a distance of more than 100 kilometers; however, almost 40 
percent of their syndication partners are located at the same site. In contrast, 
almost 70 percent of private VC companies’ syndication partners are located at a 
distance of more than 100 kilometers and 21 percent are located abroad, 
distributions that parallel the spatial distribution of their investments (Figure 5). 
Unfortunately, we do not have data on the role the investors usually play within a 
syndicate, i.e., if they are lead- or co-investors. Having this information would 
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Figure 6: Average share of syndication partners within a certain distance (in 
percentage of the total portfolio) 
On the whole, there are some very distinctive differences between public VC 
companies and their private counterparts. Initially, these differences appear to 
support the assumption that public VC companies are properly performing their 
tasks, especially the duty to promote the local economy. However, a detailed 
analysis of their investment behavior is necessary before the assumption can 




3.3  The selection process of public and private VC companies 
An initial look at the heterogeneity within the data set indicates that public and 
private VC companies are very different. A detailed analysis of their selection 
processes and their monitoring and consulting activities might allow more insight 
into whether public and private VC companies behave in ways that will facilitate 
achieving their different objectives. Therefore, a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is 
employed to compare both groups. This test allows the comparison of two 
subsamples by assigning a rank to each individual observation. Therefore, the test 
is able to reveal the relation of two groups even if the assumption of a normal 
distribution is violated or if the variances between the subsamples are explicitly 
different. A positive value indicates that the sum of the ranks for the public VC 
companies group must be larger than the sum of the ranks for the private VC 
firms. For example, the positive value in the third row and the last line of Table 1 
shows that the public VC investors regard possible exits of their investments as 
less important than do their private counterparts. 
Table 1 depicts the average importance and the rank sum comparison of 
certain variables regarding the selection of new investments by public and private 
VC companies. Both public and private VC firms organize their selection process 
in teams, expressed by the total number of people involved in the selection 
process of a single project. However, the difference is not statistically significant. 
Furthermore, there are obvious differences in the methods public and private VC 
firms use to contact potential targets for investment. The range of possible 
answers to the interview question on the types of contact methods used is between 
1 (this way is never used) and 4 (this form of approaching new investment 
possibilities is always used). Most of the contacts for both public and private VC 
companies result from active marketing, syndication partners, or a direct request 
by target firms. Public VC companies more often make use of intermediaries such 
as the chambers of industry and commerce and start-up centers than do private 
VC firms. The difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent and the 5 
percent level, respectively. This indicates that public VC companies are more 




performing their task of promoting regional business development, this deep 
involvement in local networks makes it possible to detect market failures. The 
deal flow via syndication partners is more developed for private VC firms, as 
proved by a statistically significant difference at the 5 percent level. This shows 
that public VC companies are required to be more active in the search for 
syndicated investment partners, rather than simply waiting to be asked. 
Several issues determine how public and private VC firms make investment 
decisions (Table 1, third part). On the questionnaire, the possible ratings for these 
variables were: not important (1), of minor importance (2), amongst other things 
important (3), very important (4), and dominant (5). For these variables, even 
stronger differences between the two groups can be found than in the case of the 
deal flow. Public VC companies are less concerned about the expected risk-return 
ratio and prefer long-term investments; they are also less concerned with 
investment exit strategies. All three differences are highly statistically significant. 
These findings may be due to public VC firm preference for silent investments 
(Figure 3). This product generally matures between seven and ten years, which 
can be regarded as long term, and normally has fixed interest payments that limit 
the risk-return ratio. Furthermore, the financier does not have to worry about 
exiting an investment. Finally, the composition of the VC company’s portfolio is 
less important for public financiers than it is for private investors. This can be 
grounded in a stronger industry specialization by private investors, and in the duty 
of public investors to promote all kinds of industries. Many public VC firms 
cannot reject investing in a biotech start-up just because they already have two 
biotech investments in their portfolio. However, some important factors are equal 
for public and private VC firms and do not show significant differences. Both 
groups look for a promising strategic orientation of the investment and well-
skilled management. The selection process of public and private VC investors is 
further evidence that public VC companies are driven by their considerably 






Table 1: Selection process of public and private VC companies (mean values and 
results of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) 







Number of people involved in 
selection process (within a single 
investment opportunity) 
3.65 4.44  0.42 
(0.68) 
      
Contact possible investment target 
by:      
• Active marketing by VC firm  2.78 2.57 -1.39 
(0.17) 
• Address by syndication 
partner 
2.44 2.82 2.53* 
(0.01) 
• Direct request by target firm  2.87 2.96  1.24 
(0.22) 
• Address by accountants or 
auditors 
2.26 2.04 -1.02 
(0.31) 
• Address by Chambers of 
Industry and Commerce 
1.87 1.21  -3.65** 
(0.00) 
• Communication to start-up 
centers 
1.70 1.36 -2.11* 
(0.04) 
      
Main factors influencing the 
investment decision:      
• Expected risk-return ratio of 
the investment 
2.61 3.64  3.19** 
(0.00) 
•  Short-term horizon of the 
investment 
1.87 2.39 2.04* 
(0.04) 
• Long-term horizon of the 
investment 
3.04 2.07  -3.16** 
(0.00) 
• Previous composition of the 
portfolio 
2.87 3.57 2.26* 
(0.02) 
• Promising strategic 
orientation of the investment 
4.30 4.21  0.10 
(0.92) 
•  Well-skilled management of 
the target firm 
4.61 4.25 -0.90 
(0.37) 
•  Exit possibilities for the 
investment 
2.78 4.22  4.16** 
(0.00) 
Number of observations  23  28   





3.4  Monitoring and advising by public and private VC companies 
A second way of assessing appropriate task fulfillment by public VC 
companies is by looking at their monitoring and consulting activities. The 
different components of the consulting provided by public and private VC 
companies (Table 2) are important as these services determine the character and 
the quality of the offered VC investment. The interviewees were asked to rate 
these variables as never (1), seldom (2), frequently (3), and very frequently (4). 
The average number of contacts between the investors and the financed 
companies per month—personal contacts as well as contacts via 
telecommunication—provide evidence for the exchange of knowledge between 
the investor and the portfolio company (Table 2). With an average of 0.9 face-to-
face contacts and 2.5 contacts via telecommunication per month, public VC 
companies have a much less intensive interaction with their portfolio firms 
compared to their private counterparts, thus supporting the hypothesis that public 
VC firms do less consulting than do private VC firms. 
Furthermore, public VC investors offer a smaller spectrum of consulting 
services (Table 2). They do not differ significantly from private VC firms in the 
provision of business-related services such as accounting, controlling, marketing, 
or financing. However, they offer a much more limited amount of consulting in 
technical problems or patent protection, as compared to private VC firms, a 
difference that is statistically highly significant. One reason for this might be that 
private VC firms tend to specialize in certain industries. Public VC investors 
usually invest in several different industries, either because of a limited pool of 
target firms or because of their duty to promote different industries. Another 
possibility for this difference is services offered might be related to employee 
qualifications. For example, private VC firms usually employ more scientists than 
do public VC firms (Bottazzi et al., 2004). Therefore, the evidence from Sunley et 
al. (2005), who state that public VC investors offer less hands-on support, is 
supported. This indicates that public VC companies deliver a market segment that 




their private counterparts is that they offer fewer services, their contribution to the 
local economy is questionable. 
Table 2: Consulting activities of public and private VC companies (mean values 
and results of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) 







Number of face-to-face contacts 
(per month)  0.90 1.26  1.70
a 
(0.09) 
Number of contacts via 
telecommunication (per month)  2.50 7.39  3.45** 
(0.01) 
      
Frequency of consulting in:       
• accounting  2.57 2.32  -1.10 
(0.27) 
• controlling  2.70 2.46  -1.28 
(0.20) 
• marketing  2.00 2.50 2.39 
(0.02) 
• technical problems  1.35 2.18  3.53** 
(0.00) 
• strategic problems  3.13 3.61  2.73** 
(0.01) 
• network advantages  2.65 2.89 1.50 
(0.14) 
• financing  3.30 3.50 1.12 
(0.26) 
• patent protection  1.35 2.54  4.21** 
(0.00) 
• juridical problems  1.39 2.14  3.28** 
(0.00) 
Number of observations  23  28   
** significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level; 
a significant at 10% level; 
prob > |z| in parentheses 
The above discussion makes it obvious that there are clear differences between 
public and private VC companies. First, public VC firms rely on their role within 
local business networks to generate their deal flow. Second, their selection 
process is mainly determined by their focus on different financial products and, 
therefore, by their objectives. Third, they offer less diversified consulting than do 




contribution to the local economy is limited. Furthermore, the results furnish 
evidence that the two groups of VC investors are not in competition with each 
other as they each supply different market segments. The public VC firms do not 
appear to provide “real” VC, which is equity investment combined with a heavy 
flow of information; rather, they offer a scaled-down version, what I term “VC-
light.” 
The results emphasize the different objectives of the groups. Public VC 
companies, because they are more involved in the local business community, can 
discover what is in need of promotion and can help financiers overcome the 
problems of a young and developing VC market. However, they appear to be 
limited in their ability to meet the consulting needs of their portfolio companies. 
This is a very interesting and somewhat disturbing finding. As discussed, public 
VC companies often finance enterprises deemed too risky or too time consuming 
by private VC companies. That public VC companies take on these somewhat 
doubtful investments without the resources, time, or money to provide adequate 
consulting seems hazardous at best, and irresponsible at worst, considering that 
the money they work with does not belong to them, but to the public they are 
mandated to serve.  
4.  Can private VC companies do the public VC firms’ job? 
The analyses provide evidence that public VC companies have different 
objectives than their private counterparts. These goals determine their different 
tasks; this is especially true for the goal of promoting the local economy. 
However, the results do not clearly indicate whether or not private VC companies 
might also be able to offer the “light” version of VC currently employed by public 
VC firms. If they could, there would be no need for public VC activity, at least in 
its actual design. In the following, I present some findings derived from 
statements by the interviewees in the survey. Since the results are based on many 
different interviews, I summarize the interviewees’ views instead of quoting them 




on the tasks of public VC companies and whether the latter really act as a task 
force for enterprises neglected by private VC investors. 
Several conclusions about the possibility and the will of private VC companies 
to replace public VC investors can be drawn from statements made by the 
investment managers during the interviews. First, the size of the deal is an 
important factor. Private VC companies typically prefer larger deals. The 
transaction costs for small deals do not differ much from the costs for large deals, 
but the returns from large investments are higher. Therefore, the ratio of return to 
effort is much better for big deals (Harding, 2002). Furthermore, large deals 
minimize the costs of searching for the investments. For example, if you want to 
invest 10 million Euros, you can either search for 100 investments each requiring 
100,000 Euros or you can search for 10 investments with 1 million Euros each. 
The search costs for the second choice will be much less than for the first. As 
already mentioned, this preference for large investments on the part of private VC 
firms leads to an undersupply of equity within the segment of small investments. 
Second, the original VC business was characterized by extremely high risk. 
This can be compensated for only by a very high profit opportunity, which is just 
possible within certain industries (Sahlman, 1990; Bygrve, 1992). Public VC 
companies in Germany do not solely focus on this concept of VC and, therefore, 
they do not need the high-yield investment opportunities, which allows them to 
invest in a wider range of industries. This diversified investment strategy is in line 
with these companies’ duty to promote the economy, something not especially 
feasible when concentrating investment in a specific industry. Furthermore, 
private VC firms have to justify their investments to their own investors. Anyone 
who invests in a VC fund is searching for an investment with high risk combined 
with high return opportunities. Several interviewees stated that VC companies that 
do not invest in high-yield investments fail at their jobs. Therefore, in their 
opinion, many private VC companies are not willing to take on the tasks of their 
public counterparts, although they might in theory be able to do so. 
Third, some interviewees mentioned that private VC companies have a certain 




companies. Entrepreneurs often have extreme reservations about direct 
investments. They fear that by giving away (in return for financing, of course) a 
part of their start-up that they will lose control over it. One VC manager even said 
that entrepreneurs regard the private VC companies as hungry grasshoppers—
“coming by, destroying everything, and jumping away.” In contrast, public VC 
companies, because they favor silent investments over direct ones, do not have 
such a negative reputation. This negative attitude toward private VC firms has 
allowed another player into the start-up financing game: banks. They increasingly 
offer mezzanine products and other financial products comparable to those offered 
by public VC companies. Moreover, some interviewees said that private investors, 
so-called Business Angels, might be able to offer the public VC companies’ VC-
light, as it requires fewer resources. As far as investment size goes, this could be 
an important development as Business Angels actually prefer smaller investments, 
which are just the type of investments private VC companies avoid. 
These findings indicate that private VC companies in Germany are not able or 
willing to undertake public VC activity. One of the interviewees summed it up 
nicely: “You can never turn a public official into a real Venture Capitalist—and 
vice versa.” However, other financiers, such as banks or Business Angels, might 
be able to take over the tasks of the public VC companies. 
5.  Conclusions and implications 
This paper analyzes the VC activity of public authorities in Germany. The results 
indicate that public VC companies in Germany are performing their tasks. Public 
VC firms serve a market segment that differs considerably from that served by 
private VC companies, and this difference is clearly reflected in the goals that 
each type of company pursues. For private VC firms, the goal is simple—make as 
much profit as possible. The goals of public VC firms, however, are more varied 
and more complicated. First and foremost, their aim is to promote the local 
economy and local entrepreneurship, to which end they prefer silent investments 
over direct ones. Furthermore, it is reflected in their selection process of new 




financial networks, is achieved by their syndication behavior. However, the 
analysis gives evidence that public VC companies are not able to handle the 
degree of consulting services desired, perhaps even badly needed, by their 
portfolio firms. This indicates that public VC is more or less a scaled-down 
version of the original VC concept since it is comprised of less hands-on support. 
The interviewees provided the answer to the question of whether private VC 
firms are willing and able to take on the tasks of their public counterparts. That 
answer is “no.” On the one hand, private VC companies do not want to invest in 
the companies in which the public authorities are invested because such 
companies typically do not fit into their risk-return requirements. On the other 
hand, private VC firms are not able to take over public VC companies’ work 
because many entrepreneurs have strong reservations about involving themselves 
with private VC firms. 
Generally, public VC companies in Germany are mainly doing what is 
expected of them. They help ensure the supply of equity for local economies; they 
help establish strong financial and business networks that could enable the 
creation of a growing VC market and an entrepreneurial environment. However, 
the analysis shows that public VC companies do not offer “real” VC as originally 
conceived, but instead offer something that could be called “VC-light”, with less 
hands-on support and different financial products. The possibility is raised, and 
this is especially relevant for policymakers, that other types of financiers, such as 
banks and Business Angels, might be able and willing to take over the tasks now 
performed by public authorities. The data used in this analysis did not permit any 
findings on whether public VC exerts a crowding-out effect, but the findings from 
the data do imply a need to reconsider how the German system of public VC 
actually works. Therefore, further research is needed to evaluate the necessity and, 
particularly, the success of public intervention in the German VC market.
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